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TAGS: [PREL](#) [PARM](#) [MARR](#) [KS](#) [KN](#) [JA](#)
SUBJECT: DEMARCHE FOR ROKG ON UNSC RESOLUTION

REF: STATE 114019

Classified By: AMBASSADOR J. THOMAS SCHIEFFER. REASON: 1.4(B)(D)

¶1. (C) Summary: On July 12, DCM Donovan took advantage of a call by ROK Embassy DCM Kim Young-sun to reiterate the need for a strong UNSC resolution on the DPRK missile launches, for the international community to speak with one voice, and to avoid allowing the DPRK to drive a wedge between the United States, Japan and ROK. DCM Kim said the ROK agreed that we should send a strong message to Pyongyang. He mentioned the Chinese draft UNSC presidential statement, but otherwise soft-pedaled ROK objections to the draft Chapter VII UNSC resolution. On other issues, Kim was not optimistic about progress in the South-North ministerial just underway in Busan, and blamed Japanese political leaders' "I don't care attitude" for the downturn in ROK-Japan relations. End summary.

¶2. (C) On July 12, taking advantage of a previously scheduled call by ROK DCM Kim Young-sun, DCM reiterated the need for a strong UNSC resolution condemning the DPRK missile launches. He emphasized that it was important for the international community to speak with one voice on the issue and not to allow the DPRK to drive a wedge between the United States, ROK and Japan. DCM explained that starting weeks before the launches and continuing in the period after, the United States had coordinated closely with the GOJ. Both sides were determined to avoid the situation in August 1998, when there appeared to be differences between the United States and Japan in the wake of the Taepodong-1 launch.

¶3. (C) Kim said the ROKG shared the U.S. and Japanese position that we must send a strong message to Pyongyang about the provocative missile launches. He called for continued close consultations, but noted that in addressing the issue, the ROKG regarded the solution as more important than the means. He briefly mentioned the UNSC presidential statement drafted by the Chinese, but otherwise soft-pedaled ROK objections to the draft Chapter VII UNSC resolution. DCM responded that the United States sought a diplomatic solution by which North Korea would reinstate its moratorium on missile testing and launches, return to the Six-Party Talks and proceed to implement the September 19 Beijing Statement of Principles.

¶4. (C) Asked about the South-North ministerial in Busan, Kim said talks were underway but there was no report yet. He noted that the DPRK delegation had arrived despite the fact that six-party talks and DPRK missile launches were the issues to be discussed. Kim said the ROKG intended to use

the talks to send a very strong message to Kim Chong-il, but added "frankly, I don't expect too much" from the ministerial.

15. (C) Kim said ROK-Japan relations were basically sound and that, in the long-term, he was optimistic. However, as contrasted with past years, senior Japanese politicians had adopted what he termed an "I don't care attitude" when it came to relations with other countries, with the result that Japan was more assertive and prone to try to change the status quo. Kim ascribed virtually all the blame for the current downturn in bilateral relations to the Japanese side.

DCM Donovan replied that good relations between the ROK and Japan were very important and pointed out that the United States continued to urge restraint on both sides in the case of bilateral disagreements.

SCHIEFFER